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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the gradual transition of British Petroleum (BP), one of the 
world's largest oil and gas companies, into a renewable energy company focused 
on sustainability and the reduction of carbon emissions. BP's leadership and ethical 
practices are compared before and after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. The 
purpose of the comparison and the broader analysis of the transition is to identify 
how effective leadership can be used to transform a company with a suspect social 
responsibility record into a leader among its peers. Lessons learned from the 
disaster, and the subsequent transition conclude the research.  
Keywords: British Petroleum, BP, leadership, ethics, energy, renewables, 
corporate social responsibility, fossil fuels, oil, crisis management, stakeholder 
management, Deepwater Horizon 
 
Introduction 
British Petroleum is a multinational oil, gas, and alternative energy company 
headquartered in London, England. The company was founded as the Anglo-Person 
Oil Company on April 14th, 1909, shortly after a large deposit of oil was located 
by British geologists in what is today southwest Iran, as reported in the “From 
Anglo-Persian Oil to BP Amoco” (1998) article. Notable acquisitions include BP’s 
purchase of Amoco in 1998 for $48 billion (Moore, 1998) and the purchase of 
Standard Oil of Ohio in 1987 for $7.8 billion (Cole, 1987). As reported by The 
London Economic (2021), the company also owns a 20% stake in Rosneft, Russia’s 
integrated oil and gas provider.  
BP is vertically integrated in the oil and gas industry to a high degree; its 
exploration, production, refining, marketing and distribution, power generation, 
and trading functions are handled internally rather than through arms-length 
transactions (Stacey & Crooks, 2016). The alternative energy business unit, 
founded in 2005, focuses on solar, wind, and biofuel energy projects and is 
integrated to a far lesser extent than the oil and gas unit (Bousso & Twidale, 2017). 
BP’s revenues and revenue growth for the last three years and that of the other oil 
and gas supermajors are provided in Table 1. The decline in revenues in 2019 is 
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attributed to a decline in crude prices, and the sharp decline in 2020 is due to the 
global economic downturn associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Table 1  
 
Revenues and Revenue Growth - Oil and Gas Supermajors - 2018 through 2020 
(Revenue Figures Expressed in Billions USD) 
Company 2018 YoY Δ 2019 YoY Δ 2020 YoY Δ 
BP 303.74 24.19% 282.62 -6.95% 183.5 -35.07% 
Chevron 166.34 17.37% 146.52 -11.92% 94.69 -35.37% 
ConocoPhillips 38.73 18.85% 36.67 -5.31% 19.26 -47.49% 
Eni 90.86 13.26% 79.57 -12.43% 51.34 -35.47% 
ExxonMobil 290.21 18.76% 264.93 -8.71% 181.5 -31.49% 
Royal Dutch Shell 396.56 27.15% 352.1 -11.21% 183.19 -47.97% 
TotalEnergies 184.106 23.48% 176.25 -4.27% 119.7 -32.08% 
 
Source:  The data was retrieved from Macrotrends (2021).  Copyright 2021 by 
Macrotrends.   Several sites consulted; see References. 
   
BP operates in more than 75 countries and owns roughly 20,300 retail service 
stations worldwide (BP, 2020a). Products sold at the service stations include 
gasoline, diesel fuel, lubricants, snacks, and beverages. To complement the goods 
offered, automotive services, including repairs, maintenance, and inspections, can 
be procured at many retail service stations. In addition to their retail service stations, 
according to the article “BP buys UK's largest car charging firm Chargemaster” 
(2018), BP has expanded their presence in the European electric vehicle charging 
station market by acquiring Chargemaster.   Furthermore, according to the report 
“Aral accelerates ultra-fast charging expansion” (2021), their presence was also 
expanded through their Aral brand, which recently announced plans to install 500 
fast-charging stations across its fleet of 120 fuel service stations in Germany.  BP 
is a company in the midst of a significant transition. Though they are one of the 
world's largest oil and gas companies, BP has stated that their future relies on 
developing and implementing low carbon and renewable energy projects, 
particularly wind and solar generation supported by battery storage. BP plans to 
finance these renewable energy projects by selling certain oil and gas assets, cutting 
their quarterly dividends, reducing investment in new oil and gas projects, and 
through the elimination of oil and gas exploration efforts in countries where it does 
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not already maintain a presence (Parnell, 2020). This focus on renewable energy is 
a stark contrast to other major players in the oil and gas industry, particularly 
ExxonMobil, which continues to prioritize investments in traditional oil and gas 
projects in their efforts to maximize shareholder returns (Trefis Team, 2021).  
Corporate Governance 
BP’s management structure consists of a board of directors, led by Chairman of the 
Board Helge Lund, and a hierarchical management team led by Chief Executive 
Officer Bernard Looney, who also serves on the board of directors. Lund became 
chairman on January 1st, 2019, and Looney succeeded Bob Dudley as CEO on 
February 5th, 2020. Shortly after the announcement of Looney as the new CEO, 
BP released a plan to achieve zero-net carbon emissions by 2050, by transitioning 
away from fossil fuels and into renewable energy (BP, 2020b). The pivot to 
renewables is a risky decision, but BP believes it is the right thing to do from an 
economic perspective, as reliance on fossil fuels is expected to decrease as vehicle 
electrification increases, and a sustainability and environmental perspective, as the 
company has experienced numerous disasters relating to their oil and gas 
infrastructure (Korosec, 2010). 
Leadership Disconnect Prior to the 2010 Disaster 
Before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP's code of conduct emphasized their 
commitment to ethics, a zero-accident culture, safety, and integrity. The occurrence 
of the disaster, and several disasters that preceded it, highlight the disconnect that 
existed between management's stated values and BP's actual business practices 
leading up to 2010. Chazan, Faucon, & Casselman (2010) reported that concerning 
BP’s management team, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
deputy secretary Jordan Barab commented that they “claim to be very much 
focused on safety, I think sincerely, but somehow their sincerity and their programs 
don't always get translated well into the refinery floor." The disconnect between 
messaging and practice described by Barab is common among large companies 
with a siloed, hierarchical organization structure like BP (Galonek, 2015).  
Crisis Management 
BP's crisis management has been tested in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster. The failure of a blowout preventer, a key component of a drilling rig 
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designed to prevent an uncontrolled release of crude oil from a well, combined with 
a failure to follow proper maintenance and operational procedures, led to the deaths 
of 11 employees and the worst maritime oil spill in history (Tabibzadeh & 
Meshkati, 2014). The damage to ecosystems, wildlife, and the environment in and 
around the Gulf of Mexico is incalculable. The article “BP Oil Spill Caused $17.2 
Billion in Natural Resource Damage” (2017) reports that researchers have 
conservatively estimated that it exceeds $17 billion. More than $65 billion in costs 
have been incurred by BP due to the disaster (Bousso, 2018). The fact that the 
company was able to weather such an unprecedented disaster speaks to their ability 
to manage and work through crisis situations.  
How BP’s Culture Contributed to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
BP's ethical record is mixed. Their brand image prior to 2010 emphasized good 
corporate citizenship, green credentials, and care for the environment (Balmer, 
2010). The company credited their operational and safety performance to their 
benchmarking efforts to identify best practices and their ability to measure key 
safety metrics, such as injuries, lost time accidents, spills, and adherence to training 
and human performance improvement programs. BP's management thought that 
they could root out any issues by measuring safety and operational performance.  
BP’s corporate culture in the months leading up to the disaster was characterized 
as having a relentless focus on cost-cutting (Verschoor, 2010). Lowering costs 
allowed BP to maintain its competitiveness with the other supermajors, most 
notably Shell, and management and the board of directors wanted to provide the 
shareholders with the greatest returns possible. To help keep costs low, BP 
instituted a variable pay program; employee compensation would be based, in part, 
on their ability to meet the financial, operational, and safety goals set by 
management.  
What BP management failed to realize is that by tying the meeting of these goals 
to employee compensation, they created a conflict of interests for their employees 
(Jennings, 2010). When safety and operational goals are tied to compensation, it 
creates an incentive for individuals to underreport incidents that require attention. 
For example, an employee who witnesses an improper or unsafe operation could 
report the issue and risk losing part of their pay or even their job. If they look the 
other way and avoid reporting the issue, operations can continue, and they and their 
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colleagues will not face any discipline. The problem can be exacerbated by peer 
pressure to avoid reporting incidents, as well as pressure from supervisors and 
managers who, like employees, are paid based on their ability to meet goals. Each 
time an issue is ignored, it becomes easier to ignore future issues. The cycle 
continues until a disaster occurs, and management is left wondering how all of the 
operations and safety controls they had invested substantial resources in could have 
failed.  
An example of how safety metrics can be misleading concerns BP’s Texas City 
refinery. In 2005, an explosion at the refinery killed 15 workers. An investigation 
revealed numerous safety and operational issues that contributed to the explosion 
and subsequent loss of life. BP subsequently invested more than $1 billion to 
upgrade the Texas City refinery to improve safety and operations. The company 
remarked that the investments helped drive down the OSHA recordable injury rate 
at the facility every year since 2005 (Chazan, Faucon, & Casselman, 2010). A six-
month inspection by OSHA of the refinery conducted in 2009 resulted in an $87 
million fine to BP (Walter, 2009). Many of the hazards that contributed to the 2005 
explosion had not been corrected. While management was celebrating the lower 
OSHA incident rate and other improved safety metrics, the lower rate was clearly 
not indicative of the actual safety situation in the refinery.  
Pivot to Renewables 
On August 4th, 2020, BP announced that it was transitioning its business away from 
fossil fuels toward renewable and low carbon energy (Hirs, 2020). Specific goals 
included the reduction of its carbon footprint by 40% within 10 years, and to 
become carbon neutral by 2050. The company also announced that it would not 
enter new countries for oil and gas development. The company believed that a 
reduction in oil and gas exploration and development activities, in conjunction with 
cutting their dividend by half and selling off certain oil and gas infrastructure, 
would allow them to conserve cash flow in order to finance a ten-fold increase in 
renewable and low carbon energy development (BP, 2020c).  
The transition was driven primarily by a crash in oil prices that began in 2018, 
combined with forecasts of continued low prices into the foreseeable future 
(Horowitz, 2020). Government policies and programs relating to carbon credits and 
emissions mandates also played a role. Low oil prices had led BP to realize record 
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losses in the second quarter of 2020 (Bousso & Nasralla, 2020). The urgency of the 
transition increased as the damaging effects of the economic shutdowns associated 
with the COVID-19 pandemic took hold. Figures 1A and 1B show how BP 
underperformed the S&P 500 in the months leading up to and following the 
pandemic. Figure 2 shows how the oil and gas industry was hit particularly hard by 
the economic shutdown relative to the broader economy. 
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Source:  The data for Figures 1A, 1B and 2 were retrieved from Yahoo! Finance 
(2021). Copyright 2021 by Yahoo! Finance. Several sites consulted; see 
References. 
Reactions to the news of the planned transition were mixed. Environmental 
organizations were pleased, though skeptical, given BP's track record concerning 
environmental performance and their past failures in the low carbon energy sector 
(Smith, 2020). As shown in Figure 3, investor reaction to the news (and the record 
quarterly losses) was negative; BP’s holding period returns for the month of August 
2020 were worst among oil and gas supermajors.  
                
Source: The data for Figure 3 was retrieved from Yahoo! Finance (2021).  
Copyright 2021 by Yahoo! Finance.  Several sites consulted; see References. 
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Despite the initial negative response among investors, BP continued to argue that 
the transition was integral to its future success. Climate change is real, and BP's 
management felt that oil and gas companies would be subjected to ever-increasing 
pressures by governments to lower emissions and move away from fossil fuels. In 
addition, by transitioning to renewables, particularly offshore wind projects, BP 
would be in an excellent position to capitalize on hundreds of billions of dollars in 
new revenue potential (Jessen, 2021).  
BP’s messaging emphasized how the transition would benefit all stakeholders 
(Williams-Grut, 2020). Investors would benefit because as the first supermajor to 
fully embrace the low carbon and renewable future, BP would gain a significant 
first-mover advantage and a greater share of revenues compared to its rivals. It is 
estimated that 9% of the world's global greenhouse-gas emissions come from the 
oil and gas industry (Bates, Desroches, Rajah, Cosby, & Perrons, 2021). BP's 
reduction of carbon emissions by 40% within 10 years and becoming carbon neutral 
by 2050 represents meaningful progress in the battle against climate change.  
Lessons Learned 
The lesson learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster is that cost-cutting to 
satisfy one group of stakeholders (the shareholders, in the case of BP) cannot be 
allowed to trump safety, ethical, and operational concerns. By focusing too much 
on costs, management can unwittingly create a culture that shows little regard 
toward other concerns, including ethics and safety. History has shown that when 
ethics and safety are disregarded, all stakeholders are impacted in a negative way. 
In contrast, investing in social responsibility creates value for all stakeholders 
(Hockerts & Moir, 2004). Better stakeholder management and an understanding of 
the need to balance shareholder concerns against other stakeholders' concerns are 
necessary to prevent such disasters from occurring.  
A second lesson learned from the lead up to the disaster is that while they provide 
value, safety metrics by themselves do not present a complete, accurate portrayal 
of the safety performance of the workforce. BP's management was convinced that 
safety performance had improved in the Texas City refinery following the 2005 
explosion that left 15 workers dead. Subsequent safety assessments performed by 
OSHA showed that those serious issues remained, contrary to company safety 
metrics that showed a marked improvement. Safety metrics need to be 
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supplemented with periodic audits and site inspections to ensure that the reported 
numbers reflect the true practices of the organization.  
BP's transition to renewables teaches us the importance of effective messaging. 
Initially, investors, environmental groups, and other stakeholders were skeptical. 
BP's messaging emphasized why the transition was needed and how it would 
benefit a broad range of stakeholders. Much of the credit belongs to CEO Bernard 
Looney and Chairman of the Board, Helge Lund. Looney's views on renewable 
energy contrast sharply with those of his predecessor Bob Dudley, who argued that 
a broad transition away from fossil fuels was unrealistic (Sedgwick & Turak, 2017). 
As Williams-Grut (2020) reported, Lund has shown strong support of Looney’s 
vision for the company, stating that the transition is the right thing for BP, its 
shareholders, and society. A year into the transition, it is clear that the messaging 
has taken root, even amongst investors who had initially criticized the change in 
direction (Noffke, 2021).  
Conclusion 
To say the least, it is ironic that an oil and gas supermajor whose actions contributed 
to the worst maritime environmental disaster in history has become a leader in the 
global transition to renewable and low carbon energy. BP's actions leading up to 
the disaster and its aftermath provide many valuable lessons about how an over-
emphasis on cost-cutting can harm the safety and operational performance. 
Additionally, an overreliance on metrics and analytics can paint a false picture of a 
company's actual performance. Site inspections, assessments, and audits, while 
expensive, can provide leaders with a more complete understanding of their 
organization. Lastly, BP’s transition to renewables shows how effective leadership 
and coherent messaging can completely transform the perception of a company. In 
BP’s case, they went from having the reputation of a social and environmental 
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